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THE AFTERMATH OF SAN JACINTO* 
I F THE Mexican Republic had confronted insoluble prob- lems during its fifteen years of independence-and this 
is attested by the fact that during the first twelve years they 
had had one emperor and five presidents-these problems 
were, in 1836, multiplied tenfold. The nation was bankrupt, 
a part of its army defeated, the remainder in ffight, its presi- 
dent captive. What was to be done to free Santa Anna, 
putting the question from the viewpoint of his supporters? 
What was to be done if he were released, putting the question 
from the viewpoint of his opponents? How could the prison- 
ers of San Jacinto be saved from almost certain execution in 
reprisal for the Goliad Massacre? Would the other Mexican 
armies in Texas suffer the same fate as that commanded by 
Santa Anna, or should reinforcements be sent, thus exposing 
the govelnment to being overthrown from within? Would 
Yucatan try to regain her independence and throw off the 
~ o k e  of Mexican rule as Texas was trying to do, and as 
Zacatecas had tried to do only the year before? Would Texas 
independence have to be recognized as a fait accompli? We 
shall see, in a cursory sort of way, how unsuccessful the 
Mexicans were in settling these questions; fate, which they 
blamed rather than tliemselves, for the disaster at San 
Jacinto, dealt its misery by the handfuls, to paraphrase a re- 
mark that Santa Anna had used in his happier days to de- 
scribe the manner in which fortune had bestowed its bounty 
upon hirn.l 
With the defeat of the Mexicans on April 21, 1836, ended 
all possibility of the reconquest of Texas, partly because the 
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prisoners proved valuable for purposes of bargaining, partly 
because the low morale of the remaining Mexican armies grew 
into panic upon hearing of the unexpected disaster. Filisola, 
upon whom fell the supreme command, described their state 
of mind in these words: 
"Defeated at San Jacinto and their leader a prisoner, with- 
out resources, the rainy season near at hand, worried and un- 
certain about conditions back home, they turned their sad 
eyes from the right bank of the Brazos upon the great deserts 
that they had just crossed . . . and they saw only a melancholy 
future which convinced them that the woods and sloughs of 
Texas were destined to become their graves; not because of 
any action on the part of the enemy, but rather because of 
abandonment, hunger, nakedness, the climate and the rigors 
of the weather, all of which awaited them."' 
This discontent and anxiety was not limited to the ranks, 
for the officers, too, were disgruntled at  the lack of food 
and extra campaign allowances. The new commander thought 
that if the officers had been allowed their rations, they would 
have gone "willingly and relieved of the worry of having to 
obtain their daily food where it was not to be found; they 
would have had more time to devote themselves to the obliga- 
tions of their respective tasks, and one could have avoided 
the bad example and scandal of the daily complaints and 
murmurs expressed with vehemence and bitterne~s."~ 
The story of Santa Anna's capture is so well known that 
we need not give the details here. When he was brought 
into the Texas camp and saw the grim expressions on the 
faces of his foe, he lost no time in getting down to the busi- 
ness of ending hostilities, First, there were the polite greetings 
between the two commanders; then Santa Anna, who is re- 
ported to have had quite a collection of Napoleonana at his 
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vast estate of Manga de Clavo near Vera Cruz, congratulated 
Houston on having conquered the mightly Napoleon of the 
West. The Mexicans doubt that this remark was made, but 
Houston and others said that i t  was true. The news of San 
Jacinto reached San Antonio a few days later, and Dr. Joseph 
Barnard, one of the physicians spared from execution at 
Goliad in order that he might attend the Mexican sick and 
wounded in San Antonio, told a Frenchman living there of 
this remark of Santa Anna. The Frenchman jumped to his 
feet and exclaimed, "What! Does Santa Anna compare him- 
self to Napoleon because he can run about with two or three 
tl~ousand ragged Indians and take a few mud towns? Does 
he think that his greatest exploit will bear any comparison 
to the least thing done by our hero?"& 
Santa Anna asked to begin the peace negotiations without 
delay, but Houston informed him that such matters as ex- 
change of prisoners and recognition of Texas independence 
must be referred to President Burnet and members of the 
Texas cabinet. But Santa Anna, anxious to do something to 
erase the memories of the Alarno and Goliad, insisted on send- 
ing an order to the Mexican armies, still numbering over 4,000 
men, to retire to Bexar to await the outcome of peace negotia- 
tions. This he did the very next day. On Saturday, two days 
after the battle, John Rusk, the onIy member of the cabinet 
present with the army, remembered that: he had not sent any 
message to other members of the provisional government who 
had taken refuge in Galveston. In fact, it was difficult to keep 
up with Burnet ~110,  while sending back messages to Houston 
to "Stop and fight. Retreat no farther," was himself outrun- 
ning all the others. He  was finally located five days after the 
battle and arrived a few days thereafter at San Jacinto. After 
a few days of discussion, the government officials decided to 
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go to Galveston where they considered that they, as well as 
Santa Anna and the other prisoners, would be safer in case the 
remaining Mexican armies should move southward. 
The mosquitoes and gnats proved to be unbearable and 
suitable quarters hard to find in Galveston; so the entire party 
went to Velasco. It was here, on May 14, that Santa Anna 
signed the two treaties, one public and the other secret, which 
granted every Texas request except that Santa Anna order 
all the Mexican armies in Texas to surrender. So severely was 
the President criticized in Mexico for his generosity that he 
was forced, upon his return to his home in 1837, to explain 
point by point why he had agreed to such humiliating terms. 
As an example, to explain the first provision of the public 
treaty which read, "General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna 
agrees that he will not take up arms, nor will he exercise his 
influence to cause them to be taken up against the people 
of Texas during the present war of independence," he said, 
"The Directory of Texas, let us call it thus, arbiters of my life 
and that of 600 Mexicans, wished to see our entire expedition- 
ary force lay down its arms and become prisoners; that . . . 
Generals Filisola, Gaona, Urrea, and Ramirez y Sesma . . . 
sign . . . not to take alms against Texas. I converted this idea 
into a personal promise on my part not to make war, one 
from which no prisoner can save himself. It was desired that 
my influence should be used upon the entire nation . . . to 
make it lay down its arms. I changed this proposal to a nega- 
tive, that is, I promised not to use my influence for the con- 
tinuation of the ~truggle."~ 
While Santa Anna was eagerly signing the treaties that 
gave him life, for which he was grasping as a drowning man 
grasps at a straw (Santa Anna likened himself to a lost traveler 
groping his way in the darkness and the storm, taking advan- 
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tage of every flash of lightning to insure his salvation), panic 
had seized the once awesome army of the Mexican Republic. 
At three o'clock on the 22nd, according to Filisola, word 
reached him of the disaster at San Jacinto, by means of a 
note written by the adjutant of the Guerrero battalion. Gen- 
eral Ramirez y Sesma, who was standing near Filisola as the 
latter read the news, asked, 'What has happened, my boy?" 
Filisola handed him the paper, saying, "Much more than we 
feared, my friend." After Sesma had read the note, he ex- 
claimed, "Heavens! He has ruined himself and us by his con- 
founded haste and his refusal to listen to the advice of his 
friends."" 
Santa Anna had never apprised any of the other generals of 
his campaign plans; in fact, Filisola said he had none. Al- 
though Santa Anna must have had some notion of what he 
intended to do, it is certain that his strategy was veiy vague, 
as evidenced by the manner in which the commander impro- 
vised and gave counter-orders from day to day. The possi- 
bility of a defeat and a forced withdrawal seems never to 
have entered his mind. One might say that he was the man 
without a plan. Filisola, then, had to devise one, and he had 
only a few hours in which to do it. Four alternatives presented 
themselves, none of them good: 
1. He could advance upon the enemy and give battle; 
2. He could remain where he was at Old Fort on the de- 
fensive; 
3. He could retreat to a safer location and reorganize; 
4. He could withdraw to Mexico. 
Filisola reasoned as follows: to attack the enemy was out 
of the question; the cumbersome army that he commanded 
could not have reached San Jacinto or vicinity for a week or 
more in the torrential rains that were falling at the time, 
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and with the resistance that would be offered at every creek 
and bayou. He would have had to post detachments at every 
crossing to hold the line of communications, and many of his 
force were sick, so that he would have arrived, by his calcula- 
tions, wit11 fewer troops than the enemy. Moreover, there 
was no assurance that he would find the quick-striking 
Texans, especially if they felt that an encounter would be 
disadvantageous. Finally, if he should overcome all difficulties 
and meet the Texans, the consequences of a Mexican victory 
would be aImost as calamitous as a defeat, for Santa Anna 
and the other prisoners would certainly be sacrificed, 
If the second alternative were adopted (remaining on the 
Brazos), it would be necessary to build barracks, repair shops, 
hospitals and forts. Then Filisola would have to send con- 
tingents of his force to hold the line to Matamoros at a point 
on the Colorado River, and to hold La Vaca, Victoria, Mata- 
gorda, Goliad, el Copano and San Patricio. He then would 
have too few men to scout the enemy and prevent a flank 
attack, as he was exposed to volunteers from the United 
States coming upon his rear by way of Nacogdoches. There- 
fore the third alternative was adopted for the moment, with 
the firm expectation that the fourth (retreat to Mexico) wouId 
become inevitable. 
During the four days following the battle of San Jacinto, 
a total of nine Mexican participants succeeded in reaching 
Filisola's army. I t  is doubtful if many more escaped, although 
a few could have hidden themselves with Mexican sympa- 
thizers, of whom there was a considerable number, Wild re- 
ports of 6,000 Texans, plus a true account of the terrible 
slaughter which did not have to be exaggerated, precipitated 
the stampede. All of Filisola's reasoning concerning what 
course of action to adopt was merely academic. 
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The Mexicans began recrossing the Brazos that very day 
and even set fire to a cotton gin to light LIP the river at  night. 
On the 23rd Filisola left General Gaona with one battalion to 
complete the crossing while he, apparently with Generals 
Seslna and Woll, marched for Mrs. Powell's place, 15 miles 
west of the Bl-azos. On the 22nd or 23rd Filisola sent an order, 
which in a11 the confusion was misdated the 24th, to General 
Urrea at Brazoria directing him to come with his entire force 
to the same meeting place without stopping for any reason 
whatsoever. With this directive went also a proclamation as 
follows: "Soldiers: A cowardly and perfidious enemy has been 
section com- able by cl~ance to acquise advantages over th, 
manded personally by the president, on account of the scorn 
that t l ~ e  enemy inspired in him, for otherwise the valor of 
the brave men who made up our forces could never have 
been checked even for a moment. This small, although very 
regrettable event, excites the Mexican army to vengeance and 
increases the indignation against the vile enemy that it is 
fighting. The wicked ones who have tried to steal a part of our 
country will keenly regret the accidental triumph that they 
have won."7 
General U~rea  arrived at Mrs. Powell's on the night of the 
24th, shortly after the remnants of Filisola's army, and asked 
to be permitted to pitch camp apart from the others, Al- 
though the new commander did not understand at the time 
why such an odd request was made, permission was granted. 
On the 25th, Filisola called a council of generals, colonels and 
lesser officers, but three of the six generals, namely Sesma, 
Tolsa and Woll, refused to attend any counciI to which lesser 
officers were invited. In order that the men might not learn 
of the disagreenlent existing among the generals, a second 
notice was sent out informing the other officers that a mis- 
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take had been made. At the meeting, presided over by 
Filisola, were Sesma, Tolsa, Wo11, Gaona and Urrea. First, 
Filisola offered to resign as supreme commander because he 
was of foreign birth, and therefore likely to inspire distrust 
in the discontented, shattered army. Gaona, another Italian, 
and Woll, a Frenchman, would have been disqualified for 
the same reason. The other three, Sesma, Tolsa and Urrea, the 
only native Mexicans, expressed their complete confidence 
in Filisola, as did Gaona and Woll; so Filisola retained his 
command. Actually Urrea secretly coveted the honor, but was 
too well acquainted with the sorry plight of the army to make 
an open bid at  the time. He foresaw that if the army remained 
in Texas, i t  faced starvation, if not annihilation; if it should 
retreat to Mexico, the commander might be court-martialed 
for withdsawing with an undefeated force which was four 
times as large as the enemy's. 
At about this point two officers who had eluded the Texans 
at San Jacinto arrived and reported that they had heard many 
shots on the 22nd, the day after the battle, and tllat without 
doubt all the Mexican prisoners, including Santa Anna, had 
been shot. Thereupon, the generals decided that they should 
retire beyond the Colorado to set up repair shops and hos- 
pitals and to replenish their supplies, although nobody knew 
how any of these things could be accomplished without a 
single gunsmith w doctor, without clothing, and almost with- 
out food, and absolutely without hope that any substantial 
quantities could be sent from Mexico. Urrea, while conceding 
that retreat was inevitable, expressed regret that previous 
conquests must go for naught. The remainder of the 25th was 
spent resting, if i t  can be said that a whole army can rest in 
a cabin with two rooms eighteen feet square, for none of the 
soldiers had ever had tents during the whole campaign which 
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had begun almost six months before. After having decided 
upon the first step to be taken by the aimy, Filisola drafted 
a communication to the Mexican government informing it of 
the outcome at San Jacinto in so far as he knew it. 
On the 26th, in a sea of mud, the army began its march 
which ended some six weeks later with the men dying from 
thirst and a scorching sun. The men were barefoot, for all 
but a lucky few had walked at  least from San Luis Potosi to 
San Antonio, then to San Felipe, down to Richmond, and 
finally to Matamoros. Their clothing had rotted from the rain 
and mud and sunshine to which they were constantly ex- 
posed. They had no tents or blankets and they slept on the 
bare ground, Most of the ox-carts and mules which trans- 
ported the scanty food supplies and munitions had long since 
been abandoned, for there was little left to transport. Some 
of the carts remaining were now broken and strewn along 
the path of retreat. From the very beginning transportation 
had been a bigger problem than Santa Anna had anticipated. 
Some of the mules had fi-ozen to death in a freak snowstorm; 
others were stolen by the Indians or stampeded by their wild 
cries and, according to Filisola, by the smell of horsemeat on 
the Indians' breath. As the Texans had buined over most of 
the grasslands, the mules had nothing to eat and consequently 
grew so weak as to exasperate the drivers, who beat them 
mercilessly or even stuck them with their bayonets. If you 
wonder why mule-drivers carried bayonets, the explanation 
is that the professional muleteers had deserted for lack of 
pay, and soldiers were impressed into this profession. The 
oxen did not fare any better, for they had no more to eat 
than the mules, and being even slower by nature, the soldiers 
tried to hasten their pace also with bayonets in order not to 
fall behind the troops. Speaking of these sad events, Filisola, 
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who admittedly did not omit a single detail that would justify 
his retreat, remarked, "It filled one with pity to see those 
suffering animals all bloody and full of wounds that fell dead 
while walking, so thin and dried up that their flesh was not 
even good to eat. Where the oxen fell, the carts were aban- 
d ~ n e d . " ~  
The few carts that were left were emptied to transport the 
sick and wounded, so that now the soldiers themselves had to 
carry all the supplies. They soon threw away their heavy 
burdens, leaving a trail littered with broken-down carts, 
harness, ammunition boxes, discarded guns and skeletons of 
both pack animals and unburied soldiers. Curiously enough, 
even food was discarded, for Santa Anna had been so nig- 
gardly in issuing food that the butter had become rancid and 
the hardtack had rotted. 
The Mexicans made fair progress on their first day out of 
Mrs. Powell's, but that night a heavy rain filled the creek on 
which .they were encamped, so that the next day, the 27th, 
the army could march only a short distance to the San 
Bernardo. At about two o'clock in the afternoon of that day 
Filisola received the first communications from Santa Anna. 
Until then it was not known that the commander-in-chief was 
still alive; iii fact, he had been considered dead. The first 
message read, "I have become a prisoner of war in the hands 
of our adversaries and they have shown me all possible con- 
sideration; in view of this I am notifying your Excellency to 
order General Gaona to countermarch to Bexar to await fur- 
ther orders, as you will do with the troops under your com- 
mand; you will likewise order General Urrea to withdraw 
with his division to Victoria; for an armistice has been agreed 
upon with General Houston while negotiations are being ar- 
ranged that will end the war forever.""his message was 
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dated April 22. At the same time there arrived another, dated 
three days later, asking for the baggage of Santa Anna, Colo- 
nel Almonte and General Castrillbn the latter of whom had 
been killed at San Jacinto. The ~r is ident  ended, "I recorn- 
mend that you fulfill my orders as soon as possible concerning 
the withdrawal of the troops, for this is very necessary for 
the safety of the prisoners and in particular for that of your 
very affectionate friend and c~mpanion,"~~ Incidentally, Fili- 
sola was obliged to buy a horse, at an exorbitant price, from 
Urrea in order to transmit these notices to the Mexican 
government. 
Almost the whole division had crowded around Filisola's 
tent in tense expectation, for this was the first post-battle 
news received from San Jacinto. Filisola announced simply 
that the President was still alive, although he and several 
other officers and soldiers were prisoners. The men then 
asked permission to beat a drum salute and fire salvos to 
celebrate the good news. This Filisola refused, saying that 
while he was as glad as they to learn that the President and 
some of the men had been spared, nevertheless, the mis- 
fortune of San Jacinto was a national disaster which, far from 
being a matter for rejoicing, should fill every Mexican with 
grief and bitterness. 
A reply was drafted in which Filisola said he would do as 
ordered, but only for the safety of the prisoners, for he was 
having great difficulty restraining the ardor of his men who 
were clamoring to revenge the defeat of their countrymen. 
You will observe that it was not until the sixth day of flight 
that Filisola had received the order to withdraw. General 
Urrea, who was plainly harboring ambitions to play a more 
important role in the leadership, offered to carry the message 
to the Texas camp, acting at the same time as an observer. 
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He could thereby determine if further action by the Mexican 
army was advisable. It was decided that General Woll should 
go instead, as he spoke English and would therefore be of 
greater service than Ui-rea. Woll was allowed to enter the 
Texas camp under a flag of truce, and after a few days during 
which he infoimed himself of the terms of the so-called 
armistice, as well as of the strength of the Texans, he was 
allowed to depart. Only a short distance away he was de- 
tained by a few Texas scouts who held him prisoner for 
some time. Perhaps he should never have been permitted to 
visit the camp in the first' place, but obviously it would be 
inadvisable to let him carry away information concerning 
the size of the Texas army, its armaments, munitions, etc. No 
doubt his detention was arranged by those in command, pos- 
sibly Rusk. When the Mexican armies had retreated so far 
that they were no longer a threat, Wall was released. The 
Texans were not so foolish that they could not see that he 
had been sent to spy on them. Filisola later frankly declared: 
"I decided to send General Woll who spoke Eng!ish and who 
could therefore not only explain himself to the enemy com- 
mander . . . , but also it would be easy for him to take ad- 
vantage of the conversation of the crowd. . . ."" 
For eight days the Mexicans laboriously moved southward 
before the third communication was received from Santa 
Anna, ordering the main body of troops to retire to Monterrey, 
leaving in Bexar a garrison of only 400 men and two pieces of 
artillery. Filisola did not stop untiI May 16, when he reached 
Goliad; then feeling himself fairly secure from attack by the 
Texans, and beyond the jurisdiction of Santa Anna, he began 
to await directives from the war department in Mexico. On 
May 25, during this stay in Goliad, he received a copy of the 
Velasco treaty of May 14 by which Santa Anna agreed that 
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all the Mexican troops should pass beyond the Rio Grande. 
This in no way changed the plans of the army, which had 
already resolved to withdraw to Mexico. Nevertheless, Fili- 
sola continued to linger, hoping that some word would be 
received from the supreme government and that any orders 
would coincide with his own intentions. 
Meanwhile, Filisola's communique of April 25 had reached 
Mexico City about May 15. During the interval between the 
Battle of San Jacinto and May 15, the government was receiv- 
ing Santa Anna's exaggerated reports of the annihilation of 
the rebels. On May 7 the Diario del Gobierno contained the 
following observation: "The worthy President of the Repub- 
lic, the immortal General in chief of the National Army, ought 
today to be in San Felipe de Austin, the Capital of those un- 
grateful colonists who are attempting to separate from us 
the country they occupy; . . . From the moment the Mexican 
soldiers placed on it the sole of their foot, they have continued 
to advance in glorious triumph without suffering the slightest 
reverse, and we may with great satisfaction predict, that by 
the beginning of May part of our army will be on the banks of 
the Sabine River, the point known as the boundary between 
the two Nations and whose Treaty of limits should then be 
settled, because as has been well said by the Great Napoleon, 
'The best Treaties are made in front of the Batteries.' "I' 
On May 19 the United States Charge d'maires at Mexico 
City, Powhatan Ellis, sent to the State Department a lengthy 
dispatch which pi-oved the alertness of the diplomatic corps 
in those days. I t  read in part: "For some days past it has been 
known the palace was in an unquiet state, and I drew the 
inference that unpleasant intelligence had been received in 
the capital. If it had been otherwise those in power would 
have procIaimed it to the world according to established 
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usage by the firing of cannon, processions, and the ringing of 
bells."ls On the same day the Dinrio del Gobierno published 
the news and the soldiery and citizens were called upon to 
rise and rescue their President from the imprisonment of his 
enemies, the infamous rebels of Texas. Ellis commented, "The 
effect of this movement time alone can fully disclose. I am 
however inclined to believe the people are not disposed to 
obey the call of those in authority; and so far as military force 
is relied on to release their illustrious President, I am confi- 
dent it must fail."'" 
The next day, May 20, the Mexican Congress passed a 
decree declaring that "The Government will carry . . . on the 
war with Texas, without paying any attention to any stipula- 
tions made, or to be made, with the enemy by the captive 
president, all of which are declared and are to be considered 
as null and void."15 The Congress had not yet, of course, 
received any notice of the treaties of Velasco, but one can see 
how well they knew the character of Santa Anna. On the same 
day a circular was issued to the citizens by the provisional 
president Josh Justo Corro stating that "During the captivity 
of his excellency the president of the republic, a band of black 
crape shall be attached to the colors and standards of the 
troops of the Mexican army," and that "The national flag 
shall be lowered half-mast until the president general is 
restored to liberty."'G 
On May 28, three days after the am-ival of the terns of the 
Velasco treaty, Filisola received the long-awaited instructions 
of the Mexican government, dated May 15, consisting of four 
recommendations: first, that he try to secure the freedom of 
Santa Anna; second, that he save the rest of the army by 
concentrating it in such a way as "to make it more respecta- 
ble, situating it at a suitable point in order that it might re- 
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ceive foodstuffs"; third, that he hold Bexar; fourth, that he 
attempt to exchange prisoners. At this late date, however, no 
steps to cany out these orders could be taken that had not 
already been taken. Nearly a month before, Filisola had sent 
General Woll to inquire about Santa Anna and the prisoners, 
and he had not yet returned. Who else would wp a t  to return 
to the Texans and face possible imprisonment or execution? 
As for Bexar, General Andrade had already been ordered to 
evacuate the city in conformity with the treaties of Velasco. 
Neither was it easy to instill respectability into a horde of 
tattered refugees or to obtain foodstuffs in a land scorched 
by the native population and already plundered by the forces 
of Urrea. As for exchanging prisoners, the Mexicans, not 
anticipating a reverse, had hardly retained any Texans for 
trading purposes. 
Finding no satisfactory suggestions in the government's 
directive, Filisola decided to stay a few days longer to receive 
a reply to a later account of his own which he had sent to 
Mexico on May 14, in which he related in detail the hardships 
of the army and the utter impossibility of further action with- 
out supplies from Mexico. During his leisure he sent another 
detailed account of the army, dated May 31, in which he 
again complained of the lack of food, clothing, medical sup- 
plies and transportation. He also expressed great concern 
over the presence of a very large number of women and chil- 
dren who had accompanied the army throughout the cam- 
paign. It was the custom in those days to require Mexican 
soldiers to gather most of their food along the way. The 
soldiers took along their wives, who performed this task 
for them and cooked their meals. As a result of the Texans' 
policy of destruction, these solduderas could find very little 
food; in fact, not enough for themselves and their children. 
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The soldiers then felt obliged to give most of their single 
ration per day to their families and this led to debility, sick- 
ness, or desertion. 
Still in Goliad, Filisola revealed an uneasy conscience over 
his inability to comply with the only recommendations so 
far received; so on June 1 he sent still another report, not only 
complaining of the lack of all necessities for the army, but 
intimating that the campaign had not been properly ~ lanned  
and executed. He said, "It is not forces nor valor that have 
been lacking on the present campaign . . . ; what was lacking 
was good organization of these forces, a better and more 
timely employment of the valor; [a lack of] planning, system, 
order, liaison, and a well defined pivotal point for the opera- 
tions; [a lack of] circumspection in the present movements 
and foresight in future movements; [a lack of] means of sub- 
sistence and conservation for the forces themselves; [a lack 
of] mobility, instruction, better morale in all the classes of the 
army, and more adequate means to facilitate the rapidity of 
the movements and operations of the campaign."" 
This was the opening shot in a war of words that lasted 
much longer than the war in Texas. For months accusations 
appeared one day, refutation the next, with Santa Anna, Fili- 
sola, and Urrea as the central figures, supported or denounced 
by a host of lesser ones. While Santa Anna never admitted 
any mistake in strategy, for that would be self-incrimination, 
he did accuse the nation of a half-hearted effort in the strug- 
gle. "It was necessary almost to improvise an army . . . ," he 
admitted in support of the above statements of Filisola, "I 
considered it a very grave evil at such time to gather a large 
force for fear a considerable fraction of it might be persuaded 
to take an active part in national affairs which sl~ould be a 
matter of calm and freedom. . . ."'' In short, he hesitated to 
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raise a large army for fear it would turn against him. 
The yune 1 declaration of Filisola, which did not limit itself 
to a report on the conditions of the army as previous ones 
had done, but which injected his personal opinions into the 
incipient controversy, indicated that a complete break had 
been made with Santa Anna, whom he mistakenly considered 
to be no longer an important factor in Mexican politics. He 
therefore waited until June 9 in Goliad for a more feasible 
program from the government, but by that time disicipline 
had so deteriorated that the retreat was resumed. The supply 
of food was practically exhausted and even water became so 
scarce that many fell by the wayside 'kith all the symptoms 
of hydrophobia." Wells were drilled, but no water was found. 
This was the army which six weeks before was marching in 
mud up to the neck. 
On June 11 an order was received from Secretary of War 
Tornel relieving Filisola of his command. The new con- 
mander-in-chief was to be General Josk Urrea, who Eronl 
the very first had insidiously plotted against Filisola, When 
he had asked permission to camp apart from the other troops 
at Mrs. Powell's, it was to conceal the small size of his forces, 
which had been depleted in order to accompany the enormous 
loot he had taken at Matagorda and other southern points and 
which he was sending back to Mexico without the knowledge 
of his superiors. When Filisola was floundering in the mud 
about April 27, Urrea forbade his scouts to give Filisola any 
information concerning the route. About May 5 he asked 
permission to advance to Victoria ahead of the main army. 
It developed that he picked up more loot at that place, de- 
priving the following army of the scanty supplies that had 
remained. Advancing rapidly to Refugio, he took the food 
which had been deposited there by the Mexican boat Se- 
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gundo Correo, and from there he advanced with such haste 
and disorder to Matamoros that General Gaona, who followed 
a few days later, found many unburied Mexican soldiers along 
the way. In Matamoros he took possession of 173,000 pesos 
left there for the use of the army, but later he could account 
for only 30,000. None of these acts equalled the villainy com- 
mitted in intercepting the government's orders to Filisola, 
and holding them until it was impossible for the latter to ful- 
$11 them even if he had wished. 
On June 13 Filisola departed for Reinosa to join his family, 
while on the same date Urrea informed Tornel: "The cam- 
paign against the rebels of Texas will be opened again as soon 
as the army has rested a little, has sufficient clothing and 
shoes and the proper foodstuffs for its subsistence; and the 
supreme government can be sure that in a very short time 
the Department of Texas will be subdued. . . ."lg Almost 
immediately Urrea began to hedge on this boast, saying that 
the army had retreated to Matamoros before he could get 
word to it to halt around Goliad or el Copano, that he found 
it in such poor candition that it could not tuin back at once, 
and that he couId not find sdc ien t  supplies in Nuevo Leon, 
Tamaulipas and Coahuila, as the small surplus that they pro- 
duced had been consumed in the campaign just ended. In 
addition, he asked for more funds, all of which prompted Fili- 
sola to comment: "That is equivalent to saying that as soon 
as he had at his disposition all the things that Filisola had 
lacked, he would resume the campaign, which, certainly, 
would have been no extraordinary featPZ0 
On June 25 Filisola received the following letter from the 
Secretary of War: "I informed his Excellency the President 
ad interim of your communication, dated Right Shore of the 
Nueces, May 31, in answer to which I must inforrn you, in 
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accordance with the supreme orders I have received, that the 
whole of this communication has been looked upon with the 
greatest indignation. Your Excellency will have to answer for 
the serious offences you have committed in not adhering to 
points which the supreme congress ordered you to main- 
tain, cost what they might. . . . Under no circumstances what- 
ever ought you to have considered that the general-in-chief 
was in full exercise of his functions while in captivity. . . . 
The President concludes by requesting . . . that you repair, 
without delay, to this capital, and there answer for your con- 
duct before the tribunals of your country."21 In the ensuing 
court-martial, the entire campaign was refought, foot by foot, 
just as it was in Texas and Washington during the next 
twenty years or so. Filisola was acquitted, because the ragged, 
starving remnant of what one was a proud army was irre- 
futable proof of the maelstrom that had engulfed it. 
The Mexican government soon regretted its appointment 
of Urrea, who used his position to further his own political 
aims. First General Amador, then Nicolas Bravo replaced 
Urrea as commander-in-chief of the Second Campaign as it 
was called, and Filisola was placed second in command, 
Supplies were consumed faster than they could be gathered, 
so that the Second Campaign was fought entirely in the War 
o5ces in Mexico City. There were still a few veterans re- 
maining from the First Campaign to instill fear in the new 
recruits who refused to march until sufficient supplies were 
sent ahead and saIaries in arrears were paid in full. Prepara- 
tions continued throughout 1837, but graduaUy the troops 
were recalled to quell disturbances in the interior, until finally 
the expeditionary army vanished completely. 
After Santa Anna had signed the treaties of Velasco and 
it was seen that the Mexican army was no longer a threat, it 
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was decided in Texas that Santa Anna would be more valuable 
in Mexico where, if his government survived, he might per- 
suade the Cabinet and Congress to ratify the treaties; or if it 
fell, and a war government should take over, Santa Anna 
could offer such opposition as to render all efforts at recon- 
quest futile, Actually, Houston had stated that Santa Anna's 
presence in Mexico would create such dissention among the 
digerent factions that no effective military pressure could be 
brought to bear against Texas. Therefore the President was 
put aboard a boat bound for Mexico, only to be forcibly re- 
moved by a group of newly-arrived volunteers under Genera1 
Thomas Green on June 1, There was a considerable faction, 
headed by Mirabeau Lamar, which was opposed to freeing 
the dictator, as we have already stated. Santa Anna, hearing 
all the clamor on shore, lost all courage, for he thought the 
Texans would surely march him to Goliad to execute him 
where Fannin's men had been slaughtered. 
In a letter to President Bul-net Santa Anna protested "for 
having been treated more like an ordinary criminal than as a 
prisoner of war." Burnet replied, "Your Excellency protests for 
having been treated more like an ordinary criminal, etc. If 
your Excellency alludes to the accommodations which have 
been assigned to you, I would reply that . . . [the reason why] 
we are at present destitute of the ordinary comforts of life, is 
mainly attributable to your Excellency's visit to our new 
country; and on this account we feel less regret that you 
should partake of our pri~ations~' '~~ 
Santa Anna, who had seen freedom so near when placed on 
the Inuincible, now felt that death was closer than ever. 
In desperation he planned to escape. A Spaniard named 
Bartolorn6 Pagt?s went to New Orleans and asked sympa- 
thizers of Santa Anna, including the Mexican consul in that 
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city, for money with which he may have intended to bribe 
the guards of the President. Pag6s returned to Columbia 
where Santa Anna was imprisoned at the home of Dr. Phelps, 
but being highly suspect because of intelligence received from 
New Orleans, he was carefully watched. When he disobeyed 
rules by speaking to the President's secretary in Spanish, he 
was arrested. Santa Anna and Almonte then had a ball and 
chain placed upon their feet, and they kept these for two 
or three months. Santa Anna denied that he had intended to 
escape, and accused his secretary of falsely denouncing him. 
Santa Anna did not, however, discard the diplomatic ap- 
proach to liberation, On July 4,1836-and the date may have 
been chosen purposely because of its association with liberty 
-he wrote a letter to President Jackson expressing his desire 
of being freed in order that he might make a visit to Wash- 
ington to talk about the recognition of Texas independence. 
A copy of the letter was given to the Mexican Minister in 
Washington, Manuel Eduardo de Gorostiza, and was pub- 
lished in the Mexican newspapers as incontrovertible proof of 
Santa Anna's treachery. The latter defended his action, saying 
he had not offered to recognize Texas independence, but that 
he had merely proposed the possibility of a peaceful solution 
subject to the wishes of the Mexican Cabinet and Congress. 
Jackson's reply stated that while he  was willing to offer his 
services as mediator if the Mexican government should so 
desire, he had been informed of the decree of May 20 disa- 
vowing any acts of Santa Anna. He added, however, that he 
would be happy if his Excellency would honor him with an 
unoEcia1 visit. Sadta Anna insisted that his letter had been 
badly translated, that Jackson misunderstood his intentions, 
that he must go and have a personal interview. The Merrican 
people, who were able to read the original, believed that 
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their former president had indicated his willingness to trade 
Texas for his freedom. 
In September, Houston was eIected president of Texas, and 
on November 25 he released Santa Anna and Almonte who, 
wid1 guides, traveled by horseback, boat, carriage and train 
to Washington. Once out of Texas, hostility to the illustrious 
ex-prisoner ceased. At every stop the people flocked to see 
him. A11 the notables along the way wanted to shake his 
hand, and the reporters in every city asked for an interview. 
The New York Times correspondent in Louisville wrote, 
t c  He would easily pass for an intelligent and active merchant. 
I have observed him without finding anything villainous 
or disagreeable in his appearance. . . ." In Kentucky he was 
invited to address several of the state legislators. The farther 
north he went, the more he was acclaimed by the abolition- 
ists as a crusader for human liberty. One Rhode Island paper 
asked, "How could we consider as a tyrant. . . one who op- 
poses rebels and treats them with the severity that they 
deserve, rebels who fight for the horrible system of slaveryTZ3 
The only recorded instance of disrespect towards the dictator 
found in these reports was one from Louisville which stated 
that some rowdy threw a brickbat at him. 
On January 18, 1837, Santa Anna arrived in Washington, 
where he conferred with Jackson with no sensational results. 
He did state that Jackson offered him six million dollars for 
Texas, but this is rather unlikely in view of the recent success 
of the Texas Revolution. After a dinner given in his honor by 
the American president, he returned by boat to Vera Cruz in 
February. Vera Cruz declared a holiday as though fkting a 
conquering hero. There were gun salutes, rockets, ringing of 
bells, triumphal arches and great throngs that waited to give 
him an ovation. While his spirits were raised by these demon- 
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strations of loyalty, he was not so emboldened that he con- 
sidered the time opportune for reoccupying the presidential 
chair. He therefore retired to his estate at Manga de Clavo 
to wait until his adversaries made a worse mistake than he, a 
procedure he had followed, and was to follow many times 
more, with excellent results. Meanwhile, he spent his time 
writing a detailed report of the campaign to the Secretary of 
War and a Manifesto to the Mexican people. In the latter 
document he enumerated all the causes of the defeat at San 
Jacinto: the negligence of General Castrillbn, the disobedi- 
ence of General Filisola, the incompetence of General Cos. 
"None of these causes depended on omissions or acts directly 
attributable to me; I can be blamed, then, onIy for having a 
weak and sickly body . . . which . . . yielded to repose."'" No, 
it was not his fault, for he was asleep when it happened! 
Returning to the questions raised at the beginning, you 
will notice that Santa Anna was not rescued by the army as 
his supporters had hoped, nor shot by his captors as his po- 
litical enemies had hoped. One might say he was freed by a 
whim of fate, which the Mexicans used so many times to 
describe their defeat at San Jacinto. The prisoners were saved 
from execution by the fact that they were kept so long as 
hostages that bitterness against them practically disappeared. 
The other armies did not suffer the same misfortune as the 
one at San Jacinto, but one can say that the results were 
hardly less disastrous. Reinforcements and supplies were not 
sent in time; in fact, there were not enough new supplies and 
men added to keep the army at its original strength. In  
Mcxico, strangely enough, the Santa Annistas were not over- 
thrown, but this was probably due to a lack of time, for Santa 
Anna's term was to expire on April 1,1837, only a month after 
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his return to the country. Yucatan did rebel in 1837 when 
Mexico began conscription for the Seco~ld Campaign. It was 
not until 1839, however, that the revolution there was success- 
ful. In 1840 Yucatan succeeded in conquering the state of 
Campeche with which it formed an alliance, and in 1846 they 
declared their neutrality in the war against the United States. 
They even sent a mission to Washington to ask for annexation 
to this country. And finally, Texas independence was recog- 
nized, although sporadic raids were made into the state, the 
most successful of which were those conducted by Generals 
Vasquez and Woll who successively captured San Antonio in 
March and September, 1842. 
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